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Abstract
We consider a world in which individuals have private endowments and
trade in markets, while their utility is sensitive to the consumption of their
neighbors. Our interest is in understanding how social structure of comparisons,
taken together with the familiar fundamentals of the economy – endowments,
technology and preferences – shapes equilibrium prices, allocations and welfare.
We find that equilibrium prices and allocations depend on average individual
centrality in the social network. As we add links to a social network, the
centralities rise and this pushes up prices of the socially sensitive good. Newly
linked agents demand more of the socially sensitive good, while the reverse
happens with regard to the standard good. We derive a formula to compute
the critical link, i.e., the new link which maximizes price increase.
We then turn to a model with heterogenous endowments, and find that
inequality in network centrality and in wealth inequality reinforce each other.
Thus a transfer of resources from less to more central agents raises prices of
the socially sensitive good and alters allocations and utilities of all agents. We
show by example that poor individuals lose utility while rich individuals gain
utility as society moves from segregation to integration.
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1 Introduction
Production, consumption and trade take place at the intersection of society and mar-
kets. Traditionally, economists have concentrated on understanding the functioning
of markets; in recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in social interac-
tion. This work has generated an array of models to study economic questions; for the
most part, however, these models focus on a setting with pure social interaction and
almost entirely abstract from prices and market competition.1 As the field of social
networks matures, we believe it is important to integrate them with traditional mod-
els of competition and exchange in markets. This general view informs the approach
we take in the present paper to study the effects of relative consumption concerns.
One of the recurrent themes in the study of individual well being is that, in addition to
own consumption, it appears also to depend on the consumption of others with whom
we interact and compare ourselves. But the happiness and therefore the consumption
of these “close by” others in turn depends on the consumption of their friends and so
on. Individual decisions on consumption are therefore shaped by the overall pattern
of connections which obtain in the society. In order to understand consumption and
welfare we therefore need a framework which takes into account of social structure,
along with the familiar fundamentals of the economy – endowments, technology and
preferences.
In this paper, we propose a simple model which extends the classical model of general
equilibrium to allow for social interaction. There is a finite group of individuals who
all have identical initial endowments and are price takers. Each of the individuals
is also directly affected by the consumption of one good by a subset of the other
individuals, whom we shall refer to as her neighbours. The structure of individual
neighbourhoods is modeled as a network. For a fixed set of prices, individual demand
depends on consumption of neighbours, whose demand in turn depends on the demand
of their neighbours and so on. This suggests that a change in the demand of agent
i will have an effect on the demand of her neighbours which will in turn affect the
demand of their neighbours, and these changes will in turn feedback on agent i. Thus
a study of individual consumption requires us to take into account paths of different
lengths via which individual agents are linked in the network.
Our first observation is that the direct and indirect effects of social interaction are
captured by eigen vector centrality of the adjacency matrix describing the network.2
Indeed, in equilibrium, individual consumption can be expressed as a function of her
1An important and early exception to this is Montgomery (1991), for recent work which seeks to
integrate social structure and markets, see Cassella and Hanaki (2006) and Galeotti (2007). Goyal
(2007) provides an overview of the recent research on social networks in economics.
2For an early discussion of such centrality measures in the social sciences, see Katz (1953) and
Bonacich (1987).
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centrality in a social network, while the price is proportional to the average network
centrality of agents in the network. As we add links to a social network, there will be
more paths between agents, the sum of centralities will rise and this pushes up prices
of the socially sensitive good. We also derive a formula to compute the critical link,
i.e., the new link which maximizes price increase. Roughly speaking, this formula says
that, when social comparison effects are small, the critical link is one which connects
the two least linked agents. With regard to allocations, we show that, as we add links
to a network, the consumption of the socially sensitive good by the connected agents
increases, while the reverse happens to non-connected agents.
These results are obtained in a benchmark model in which all agents have the same
endowments. We then extend our model to allow for resource heterogeneity. Our
main result shows that wealth and network heterogeneity reinforce each other: a
transfer of resources from a poorly connected to a well connected agent raises prices
and alters allocations and utility across the economy. The model with heterogeneity
allows us to explore an interesting theme in the recent happiness literature: the role
of shifting social interactions. We illustrate through examples, how poorly endowed
individuals lose, while well endowed individuals gain, as we move from a society which
is segregated along class lines to an integrated society.
These observations on effects of social networks on welfare naturally lead us to exam-
ine the stability of different social networks. We illustrate through an example that
different structures ranging from the empty network to the complete network may be
stable for given economic fundamentals. We interpret this finding as saying that a
variety of different social norms with regard to conspicuous consumption may obtain
across societies, which are otherwise identical.3
We finally discuss alternative specifications of consumption externalities, e.g., where
the externalities depend solely on the average of neighbours, or the maximum of
neighbours, or where externalities arise in the consumption of both goods. We find
that in such economies there exists equilibria which are insensitive to patterns of
social interaction.
There is a vast literature in economics, as well as in other disciplines, on the impor-
tance of relative consumption for individual well being. Perhaps, the best known early
work is Veblen’s (1897) critique of conspicuous consumption. In recent years, relative
consumption concerns have been presented as the natural explanation to account for
the Easterlin puzzle: the observation that happiness is positively related to incomes
in a society at any point in time, but that increases in income in the society over time,
appear to have little effect on happiness. Recent papers by Kuhn et al (2008) and
Luttmer (2005) present clear empirical evidence in support of the role of social effects
3For an interesting recent treatment of endogenous groups in a model of social interactions, see
Zanella (2007).
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on personal consumption and happiness. Kuhn et al (2008) find that an increase in
the incomes of neighbors have significant effects on individual consumption patterns,
and moreover that these effects are stronger for immediate neighbors as compared
to general neighborhood effects. Luttmer’s (2005) work suggests that changes in the
incomes of neighbors have effects on self-reported levels of individual happiness and
moreover the magnitude of these effects depends on the frequency of interaction with
the neighbors.
Over the years, a number of models on relative consumption concerns – both at a per-
sonal level (across different selves of an individual, over time) as well as at a social level
(across different individuals) – have been proposed. See, e.g., Abel (1990), Arrow and
Dasgupta (2007), Easterlin (1974), Cres, Ghiglino and Tvede (1997), Frank (1985),
Frey and Stutzer (2002), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), Layard (2005), Blanch-
flower and Oswald (2004), de Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2003), Veblen (1899)
and Dussenbery (1949). While these models differ in many ways, they share one
common feature: they suppose that individual utility or well being depends on own
consumption and average social consumption. However, the motivation for relative
consumption effects in this literature typically arises at a local level, i.e., when we
compare our consumption with the consumption of friends, colleagues and relatives.
This formulation of average consumption is thus restrictive on two counts: one, it pre-
cludes the study of size of effects which empirical work suggests are important. Two,
the average formulation precludes the study of changing patterns of social interaction,
a subject which has been the topic of public debate (see e.g. the discussion in Layard
(2005)). These considerations motivate our attempt at developing a framework in
which local consumption effects can be studied systematically.4
Our paper builds on two earlier papers, Ballester, Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2006)
and Tan (2006). Tan (2006) studies the effect of social networks in a general equilib-
rium model. There are two main differences between the papers. One, he looks at
specific networks – such as star and regular networks – while we allow for arbitrary
networks. Our study of general equilibrium in arbitrary networks is made possible
due to our key result that the social network effects are summarized in a simple mea-
sure of network centrality. We are also able to provide a general set of results on the
effects of endowment transfers in a setting with social interaction; to the best of our
knowledge these results are new.
Ballester, Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2006) study a game of social interaction and
derive a relation between Nash equilibrium actions and network centralities. While
our work uses similar measures of network centrality, the motivation of our paper
and the principal findings are quite different from their work. We are interested
4There is also an interesting line of research which examines the effects of trading restrictions –
modeled in terms of networks – on equilibrium outcomes. See e.g., Gale and Kariv (2007), Kranton
and Minehart (2001), and Kakade, Kearns, and Ortiz (2005).
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in the ways in which general equilibrium prices, individual consumptions and well
being, are jointly shaped by social interaction and competitive markets. This leads
us to focus on the ways in which social interactions alter prices, which in turn alter
allocations and utilities. Moreover, in our paper, a key issue is how social structure
and endowment heterogeneity complement each other in defining prices and utilities.
On a technical note, we also note that our characterization of equilibrium obtains for
all levels of social consumption effects. This is in contrast to Ballester et. al. (2006)
result, as well as most of the literature that follows this paper which requires the
social effects to be small.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 sets out the basic model of net-
work based consumption externality and section 3 solves this model. Section 4 takes
up the model with endowment heterogeneity. Section 5 presents some preliminary
findings on stable social networks. Section 6 discusses some alternative formulations,
while section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2 Model
We consider a pure exchange economy populated with N consumers, i = 1, ..., N .
Let N(i) be the set of neighbours of consumer i and let ni = |N(i)|. There are two
consumption goods. We denote by p the price of good 2, good 1 being the numeraire.
Consumers care about their own consumption of good 1 and good 2. We note xi
the consumption of good 1 by agent i and yi the consumption of good 2 by agent
i. Consumers also care about the consumption of good 2 by their direct neighbours,
i.e. consumer i cares also about {yj}j∈N(i). Consumer i is endowed with a bundle of
the two goods (ωi, νi), where ωi > 0 and νi > 0. We will represent the pattern of
neighbourhoods by G, which is a n×n matrix of 1’s and 0’s. An {i, j} square in this
matrix takes value 1 if and only if i and j are direct neighbours. We will assume that
in this matrix the diagonal terms are all set equal 0.
5After we had written our paper, we became aware of three new papers which study related
ideas Bramoulle, Kranton and D’Amours (2008), Bloch and Querou (2008) and Mookherjee, Napel
and Ray (2008). We briefly discuss the latter two papers, as they relate to social interactions and
markets. Bloch and Querou (2008) study optimal discriminatory pricing by firms to consumers
who experience consumption externalities with respect to their neighbors. They obtain a number
of results which relate network centrality of individuals to optimal prices. Mookherjee, Napel and
Ray (2008) study a model where families invest in the skills of children and these children then earn
wages. The incentives to invest in human capital is related to the average wage in the local social
environment. Their main results pertain to the existence of equilibrium in which communities with
low and high human capital emerge due to due to the complementarities in the acquisition of human
capital across created by the comparison of wages. So, while these papers deal with related themes
the economic contexts they study are quite different. So we will not provide a detailed discussion of
the results.
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In order to model interpersonal comparisons in consumption we let the utility depends
on own consumption in the two goods as well as the consumption of the neighbours
in the second good. We will assume that:
Ui(xi, yi, y−i) = ui(xi,Φ(yi, y−i)) (1)
where Φ : R × Rni → R and −i is the set of neighbours to agent i. The function Φ
is increasing in yi and decreasing in each element of the vector y−i. It is also natural
to assume that when all neighbours consume yi, that is each component of y−i is
equal to yi, then the effect of the neighbours vanishes, i.e. Φ(yi, yi) = yi. As we are
concerned with interpersonal considerations a minimal specification is
Φ(yi, y−i) = yi − α
∑
j∈N(i)
(yj − yi) (2)
where α is a real number, which may be interpreted as a measure of the strength of
comparison (or externality). The case where α = 0 corresponds to the benchmark no
externality model. When α > 0 individuals are negatively affected by the consump-
tion of their neighbors. By contrast, α < 0 corresponds to a positive externality. In
our analysis we will focus on the case α > 0.
Finally, we assume that ui has the familiar form
ui(x, y) = x
σy1−σ (3)
with 0 < σ < 1. The utility function can then be written as
ui(xi, yi, y−i) = ui(xi, yi, {yj}j∈N(i)) = xσi
yi[1 + αni]− α
 ∑
j∈N(i)
yj
1−σ (4)
The specific form of the utility function is a consequence of the introduction of inter-
personal comparisons. The function can be written in a way that allows for a more
intuitive interpretation in which the effect of departures from the average is weighted
by the number of neighbours, i.e. the social pressure. Indeed, we can write
ui(xi, yi, y−i) = ui(xi, yi, {yj}j∈N(i)) = xσi
yi + αni
yi − 1
ni
∑
j∈N(i)
yj
1−σ 6 (5)
Remark: Our utility function may be derived from a more general specification
when variations in consumption across individuals are small and individuals have
6For the use of a similar utility function in a model of growth and happiness, see Cooper, Garcia-
Penalosa and Funk (2001).
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identical characteristics. Indeed, subject to this condition we may linearize Φ with
respect to y−i near yi and keep only the first order terms. We then have
Φ(yi, y−i) ' Φ(yi, yi) +
∑
j∈N(i)
∂jΦ(yi, yi)(yj − yi) (6)
where ∂jΦ(yi, yi) stands for the partial derivative of Φ in respect to jth neighbour’s
consumption, evaluated at the point where all consumptions are yi, i.e. y−i = yi.
As all agents are identical we may assume that ∂jΦ(yi, y−i) = −α where −α is the
common value of all the partial derivatives of Φ with respect to −i.
We emphasize that in the above formulation both the individual consumption as well
as the size of the total consumption of neighbors matters. This is consistent with
some recent empirical work by Luttmer (2005). In this paper, the author emphasizes
the role of neighbourhoods in shaping individual welfare. In particular, Table 8 in his
paper shows that increasing the number of meetings with neighbours matters for the
magnitude of the effect of neighbours. This empirical work does not distinguish be-
tween more meetings with the same neighbors and a larger number of neighbors. This
suggests that it is the overall magnitude of difference between personal consumption
and consumption of neighbors which may be more appropriate.
While we believe that our formulation is consistent with empirical work, we are aware
that there is no consensus on the form of interpersonal comparisons of consumption.
We therefore feel that it is important to examine the effects of alternative formula-
tions of interpersonal comparisons. Section 6 presents our analysis of a number of
alternative formulations.
We will suppose that good x is the numeraire good and that the price of good y is p.
A consumer i’s optimization program reads
max(xi,yi) ui(xi, yi, {yj}j∈N(i))
s.t. xi + pyi = ωi + pνi
(7)
Let (x̂i, ŷi) solve this problem.
A general equilibrium is a strictly positive price p and a vector of allocations (x̂i, ŷi)i∈N
such that
1. Markets clear:
∑
i∈N x̂i =
∑
i∈N ωi,
∑
i∈N ŷi =
∑
i∈N νi.
2. For each i ∈ N , (x̂i, ŷi) solves the optimization problem outlined above.
We will study equilibrium in which xi > 0, yi > 0 as well as yi+αni
[
yi − 1ni
∑
j∈N(i) yj
]
>
0 for all i.
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The first order conditions associated with the optimization problem are
0 = σxσ−1i
yi[1 + αni]− α
 ∑
j∈N(i)
yj
1−σ − λ
0 = xσi (1− σ)[1 + αni]
yi[1 + αni]− α
 ∑
j∈N(i)
yj
−σ − λp
0 = ωi + pνi − xi − pyi (8)
For fixed prices, how does a neighbor’s consumption of the socially sensitive good
affect the marginal returns on own consumption of y? We note from the second line
in (8) that for fixed ni, marginal utility to yi is clearly increasing in consumption
of y by a neighbor. Next we consider the impact of an additional neighbor. It is
easily seen that so long as consumption by the new neighbor is equal or larger than
current own consumption, the marginal utility from consumption of yi will increase.
But, with a bit of algebra, we can also see that if the consumption of the neighbor is
significantly smaller than current own and current neighbors consumption then the
marginal utility from yi may actually fall upon the addition of a new neighbor.
We observe that in our model the first order conditions are necessary for an interior
optimum. We will restrict attention to interior solutions of the maximization problem
faced by individuals.7 The demands for goods 1 and 2 are given by:
f 1i (p, {yj}j∈N(i)) = σ
ωi + pνi − α
1 + αni
p
∑
j∈N(i)
yj
 (9)
f 2i (p, {yj}j∈N(i)) =
1− σ
p
ωi + pνi + σ
1− σ
α
1 + αni
p
∑
j∈N(i)
yj
 (10)
We can use equation (10) to obtain for each i:
yi − ασ
1 + αni
∑
j∈N(i)
yj − 1− σ
p
(ωi + pνi) = 0 (11)
This can be rewritten as
yi − ασ
1 + αni
Gi · Y − 1− σ
p
(ωi + pνi) = 0 (12)
7We note that the optimum will be interior if endowments are positive, prices are positive and
relative consumption effects are sufficiently small.
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where Y is the N -dimensional vector of good 2 consumption, Gi is the ith row of the
N ×N matrix of connections, i.e. the adjacency matrix.
The demands yi for all consumers may be expressed in matrix form as[
I − ασGN]Y − 1− σ
p
W = 0 (13)
where I is the identity matrix and GN is the N ×N matrix of connections in which
every row is normalized so that the sum of the elements add to ni
1+αni
, and W is the
N -dimensional vector of individual wealth.
Whenever
[
I − ασGN] is invertible we can write the demand for good y as:
Y =
1− σ
p
[
I − ασGN]−1W (14)
3 Homogeneous agents
In this section we will study the case where all individuals have the same preferences
and the same endowments. In this benchmark case, with no social interaction, the
equilibrium is unique and characterized by no trade and the price is simply given by a
ratio of endowments and the relative importance assigned by individual preferences to
the two goods. How does social interaction affect equilibrium prices and allocations?
Our first finding is that general equilibrium prices can be expressed as a function
of the average centrality of the network, and that an individual’s consumption is
proportional to her network centrality. We then examine the effects of changing
networks. We show that adding a link to a network always raises price of the socially
sensitive good and a link between i and j alters their equilibrium consumption of
the goods in proportion to their centrality in the initial network. We illustrate the
quantitative significance of these effects with the help of numerical examples.
Since endowments are identical, the wealth of an agent is given by
Wi = ωi + pνi = ω + pν (15)
which means that
W = (ω + pν)J (16)
where J is the N -dimensional vector of ones. We can now use equation 14 to obtain:
Y =
1− σ
p
[
I − ασGN]−1 J(ω + pν) (17)
We now introduce our concept of network centrality.
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Definition 1 Let GN be the N ×N adjacency matrix in which a row i is normalized
by 1
1+αni
, where ni is the degree of agent i. Then we define the centrality vector B by
B =
[
I − ασGN]−1 J (18)
where J is the N dimensional vector of ones.
When ασ is smaller than the inverse of the modulo of the largest eigenvalue of GN ,
the inverse
[
I − ασGN]−1 can be expressed as a power series
[
I − ασGN]−1 = ∞∑
s=0
(
ασGN
)s
(19)
In our model, observe that the condition for convergence is always met. This is
because, from the Perron-Frobinius Theorem we know that an eigen value is less than
the maximum sum across all rows. In our case, it can be checked that the maximum
across all rows is indeed smaller than σ. By assumption σ < 1 and so the series
converges. This is an important point: in Ballester, Calvo-Armengol and Zenou
(2006), convergence has required that local effects be small, i.e., α be sufficiently
small. In our framework, due to the normalization, implicit in the definition of the
matrix GN , we do not require any assumptions on the magnitude of the local effect.
The element (i, j) of this matrix can be written as{[
I − ασGN]−1}
(i,j)
=
∞∑
s=0
(ασ)s{(GN)s}(i,j) (20)
where {(GN)s}(i,j) counts the number of paths starting in j and ending at i of length
s, weighted by the factors defined in Definition 1. This expression provides a nice
interpretation of centrality in terms of interactions with neighbours of increasing
distance. In fact the centrality of an individual Bi, reflects the weighted sum of paths
of all the different possible lengths.
We now have all the notation and concepts needed to state our first result which
characterizes the relation between market equilibrium and social interaction. Let
B = 1
N
∑N
k=1Bk.
Proposition 1 There exists an interior equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the alloca-
tions of goods for individual i are
xi = ω
1− (1− σ)Bi
1− (1− σ)B (21)
yi = Bi
1− σ
p
(ω + pν) =
Bi
B
ν (22)
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while the price is given by
p =
ω
ν
[
1
1− σ
1
B
− 1
]−1
(23)
Proof: The proof of existence is constructive. From equations (17) and (18) it follows
that individual allocations are collinear in B:
Y = B
1− σ
p
(ω + pν) (24)
In order to find the price p that equates supply and demand we solve the market
clearing equation:
N∑
i=1
yi =
1− σ
p
(ω + pν)
N∑
i=1
Bi = Nν (25)
so that
1− σ
p
(ω + pν) =
Nν∑N
k=1Bk
(26)
Therefore
Y =
B∑N
k=1Bk
Nν =
B
B
ν (27)
with B = 1
N
∑N
i=1Bi. Equivalently we have
yi =
Bi∑N
k=1Bk
Nν =
Bi
B
ν (28)
Finally, from equation 26 note that the equilibrium price is given by the equation
(1− σ)ω
p
=
Nν∑N
i=1Bi
− (1− σ)ν (29)
leading to
p =
ω
ν
[
1
1− σ
N∑N
i=1Bi
− 1
]−1
(30)
From
xi = ω + pν − pyi (31)
we get
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xi = ω +
ω
ν
[
1
1− σ
N∑N
k=1Bk
− 1
]−1 [
ν − Bi∑N
k=1Bk
Nν
]
= ω
N − (1− σ)NBi
N − (1− σ)∑Nk=1Bk = ω1− (1− σ)Bi1− (1− σ)B (32)
At this stage it is necessary to check that this allocation is indeed an equilibrium.
Under our hypothesis on ασ, Bi > 0 and B > 0. We need to verify that p > 0, xi >
0, yi > 0 and yi(1 + αni)− α
∑
j∈N(i) yj > 0 for all i. These inequalities are verified
in the Appendix.

This result explains how markets and social structures jointly shape prices, allocations
and welfare. We first illustrate the effect of social structure on equilibrium outcomes
and welfare. We note that, in our model, the addition or deletion of a neighbor alters
the utility function of the individual, making utility comparisons difficult. We will
therefore restrict ourselves to comparing utilities of agents whose neighborhood, and
hence preferences, remain unchanged.
Example 1 Social embeddedness and economic outcomes
In this economy all agents has an endowment of 10 units of either good and
α = σ = 0.5. Figure 1 presents four standard networks: empty, star, ring, and core-
periphery. Figure 2 summarizes information on market equilibrium prices, allocations
and utilities. We would like to bring out two points: one, social structure has signif-
icant effects on prices and allocations. A move from the empty network to the ring
raises prices by a 100%, but has no effects on allocations. On the other hand, moving
from the ring to the star lowers prices by almost 12% and leads to 16% increase in
consumption of the socially sensitive good and a 29% decrease in consumption of
standard good by the central agent. Our second point is that social structure has
substantial effects on welfare: the utility of the peripheral agents in the star and the
core-periphery network (with one neighbor each) are very different.
4
We now discuss the role of market interaction in shaping equilibrium outcomes.
Example 2 No man is an island: General equilibrium effects
In this economy all agents have an endowment of 10 units of either good and
α = σ = 0.5. Figure 3 presents four networks with progressively increasing links but
they all share the feature that agent 8 is isolated. Figure 4 summarizes information
on market equilibrium prices, allocations and utilities. We would like to bring out
12
two points: one, as the connected part of society gets more densely linked, the price
of the socially sensitive good steadily increases while its consumption steadily moves
away from the isolated agent and toward the more connected individuals. Two, we
observe that the utility of the isolated agent actually increases from 10.44 in the
initial network all the way to 11.36 when the core social group constitutes a complete
hexagon.
4
First, we observe that equilibrium price depends on the average centrality: networks
with higher average centrality will exhibit higher prices for the socially sensitive good.
We also observe that prices are not affected by the distribution of centralities. This
is an aspect of the linear structure of the model. Moreover, equilibrium price is
increasing in the importance of the socially sensitive good, which is reflected in the
value of 1− σ.
Second, we note that the consumption of socially sensitive good yi is proportional
and increasing in the centrality of agent i. Correspondingly, the consumption of the
standard good x decreases with the centrality. We now comment on the relation
between degree and consumption. One may expect that a higher degree individual
will be led to compare himself with more neighbors and this will push him toward
higher consumption of the socially sensitive good. While this is clearly true, it is also
the case that the consumption of the neighbors is in turn affected by their degree
and so forth. The centrality measure captures this indirect effect of the structure of
interaction. These considerations are reflected in the following recursive formulation
of the centrality measure:
Bk = 1 + ασ
1
1 + αnk
∑
j∈N(k)
Bj (33)
The consumption yi of the socially sensitive good by agent i is increasing in the
number of direct neighbours and also positively affected by the centrality of these
neighbors. We observe that individual consumption of good 1 is larger than initial
endowment if and only if centrality is below the average, i.e.
∑N
k=1Bk > NBi or
1
N
∑N
k=1Bk > Bi. The reverse is true for good 2. The intuition is that the more
central an agent is, the more she consumes of good 2 in order to cope with the larger
negative externality.
Changing networks: Our characterization of prices in Proposition 1 tells us prices
are an increasing function of average network centrality. Adding links in a network
raises paths between players and this raises average centralities, which in turn raises
raises prices. The following result summarizes these ideas.
Proposition 2 For small α, starting from any network G 6= Gc, an addition of a
link raises p; it therefore follows that this price is minimized in the empty network
and maximized in the complete network.
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Adding links clearly increases number of paths between any two agents, and this
pushes towards greater centrality for all individuals. In our setting, it also alters the
weights of the paths as the number of neighbors also appears in the denominator of
the interaction matrix GN . This presents some technical problems which complicate
the argument significantly and we are obliged to restrict attention to small values of
α. The details of the computations are provided in the appendix.
We now examine the nature of the critical link: this is the link which has maximum
impact on price of socially sensitive good. From Proposition 1 and the discussions
above, this is the link which increases the sum (or average) centralities in the network.
we have been unable to obtain a general result for arbitrary levels of social spillover,
but we are able to say something for small α.
Proposition 3 Fix a network g 6= gc. For sufficiently small α, the critical link gij is
the solution to the following problem:
max
ij
ασ
(1 + α(ni + 1)) (1 + αni)
+
ασ
(1 + α(nj + 1)) (1 + αnj)
(34)
This result says that for instance in any network g with two or more isolated agents,
a critical link would be between a pair of isolated agents. This result is somewhat
counter-intuitive, as the first guess as the location of a critical link would be that
it should connected agents with high degree. There are two reasons underlying our
result: one, we focus on sufficiently small α, which allows us to ignore second and
higher order effects of a link. two, in our model the increment to centrality of two
connected agents varies inversely with their current degree, due to the normalization
involved in the construction of the adjacency matric GN .
We now examine how new links affect individual demands. To gain some intuition for
the forces at work, consider the case where individuals are located around a circle and
a link is added between two individuals i and j. In the initial network all individuals
are in a symmetric situation and so the first effect of the additional link is that it
increases the marginal return from increasing consumption of good 2 for both i and
j. Such an increase in turn leads creates pressure on the demands for good 2 from the
neighbors of i and j and the effects may be rather large depending on the centrality of
these individuals. However, when α is very small, these second order or indirect social
effects on the neighbors of i and j are relatively small and the first order direct effects
prevail. The following result summarizes our analysis of the effects of additional links
on equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Suppose a new link is added between two agents i and j. There is an
αˆ > 0 such that for α < αˆ, there is an increase in the consumption of the socially
sensitive good and a decrease in the consumption of the standard good by both i and
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j. Correspondingly, the consumption of the socially sensitive good decreases while the
consumption of the standard good increases, for all agents h 6= i, j
The following example illustrates the effects of an additional link on equilibrium prices
and allocations.
Example 3 The critical link.
In Figure 5 we illustrate two ways of adding links, in one case we add a link between
two central agents, while in the second case we add a link between two spoke players.
The parameter values and effects of link are given in Figure 6: we find that adding
a link between the hub agents has a lower impact on prices as compared to adding
link between the spoke players. Similar relative ranking also obtains under different
values of α.
4
4 Wealth heterogeneity
In the previous section we studied the effects of social interaction in a setting with
identical agents. This section explores the ways in which heterogeneity in endowments
is mediated via the social network and how they together shape market equilibrium
and allocations. The principle insight of this analysis is that heterogeneities in endow-
ments and network centrality are complementary in their effects, i.e., the wealth of an
individual affects equilibrium prices and allocations in proportion to her centrality!
We exploit this property to show that redistributions of wealth across individuals
with different network centralities have significant price and allocation effects. By
contrast, in the absence of social interaction, such redistributions have no effect on
equilibrium prices.
Recall that the demand for the socially sensitive good is given by:
Y =
1− σ
p
[
I − ασGN]−1W (35)
Let the (column) vector of ωi be denoted Ω and let Ψ denote the (column) vector of
νi. Then, we have
W = Ω+ pΨ (36)
If then we note M =
[
I − ασGN]−1 we get
Y =
1− σ
p
M(Ω + pΨ) (37)
=
1− σ
p
MΩ + (1− σ)MΨ (38)
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Note that MΩ is the network centrality weighted by the endowments of good ω and
we shall refer to it as ω− centrality and denote it by Bω. Similarly MΨ is the
ν−centrality and we denote it by Bν . Note that we recover the homogeneous case
by setting MΩ = MJω = Bω and MΨ = MJν = Bν where B is as in Definition
1 above. The equilibrium price vector can be obtained from the market clearing
condition
N∑
i=1
yi =
N∑
i=1
νi ⇐⇒ Y ′J = Ψ′J (39)
We get
Ψ′J =
1− σ
p
[M(Ω + pΨ)]′ J
=
1− σ
p
[MΩ]′ J + (1− σ) [MΨ]′ J
so that
p =
(1− σ) [MΩ]′ J
Ψ′J − (1− σ) [MΨ]′ J (40)
Finally, the equilibrium allocation of the socially sensitive good is
Y =
Ψ′J − (1− σ) [MΨ]′ J
[MΩ]′ J
MΩ + (1− σ)MΨ (41)
while the allocation in the non-socially sensitive good can be obtained from
X = W − pY (42)
Let Rν denote the total endowment of the socially sensitive good and let Rω denote
the total endowment of the other good. We summarize our discussion in the following
result.
Proposition 5 In an interior equilibrium the allocation of individual i is given by:8
yi =
Rν − (1− σ)
∑
i∈N Bν,i∑
i∈N Bω,i
Bω,i + (1− σ)Bν,i. (43)
xi = ωi +
(1− σ)B′ωJ
Rν − (1− σ)B′νJ
vi)− (1− σ)B
′
ωJ
Rν − (1− σ)2B′νJ
[Bv,i +Bw,i) (44)
Furthermore, the equilibrium price is given by
p =
(1− σ)B′ωJ
Rν − (1− σ)B′νJ
(45)
8As in the basic model, the inverse of the adjacency matrix is well defined; an equilibrium exists
when the ‘net’ consumption of the socially sensitive good and prices are positive.
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We observe that the sum of ω−centralities can be expressed as∑i∑j Mijωj. The
above result says that the price of the socially sensitive good is increasing in the sum
of ω−centralities. This is intuitive: this increase may be caused by an increase in
endowments or an an increase in the network centrality per se. An increase in endow-
ment of the standard good raises incomes and leads to an increase in demand for the
socially sensitive good; the price of the socially sensitive good has to increase to offset
this increased demand. Similarly, keeping endowments of the standard good fixed,
an increase in centralities of agents increases demand for the socially sensitive good
and this necessitates an increase in equilibrium prices (as endowments are constant).
The effects of changes in ν− centrality are more complicated. It can be checked that
an increase in ν− centralities caused by pure network changes will raise the price of
the socially sensitive good. However, an increase in endowment of some agents will
lower price. The magnitude of this effect on price will depend on the centrality of the
agents whose endowments have been altered: in particular, the fall in price is smaller
the larger the centrality of the agents who are given more endowments. Similarly,
we observe that the equilibrium allocations are related to the weighted centralities of
agents. In particular, the consumption of the socially sensitive good is increasing in
the ω-centrality as well as the ν-centrality of an agent, while the converse is true for
the equilibrium allocation of the standard good, ceteris paribus.
We next consider the effect of redistributions in endowments. In our model, with
no consumption externalities a redistribution leaves the price unchanged. We can
deduce this from the formula for prices in Proposition 5 and noting that Bw and Bv
will simply be equal to the aggregate endowments of these two goods, respectively,
when α = 0. When α > 0, social interaction has significant effects on prices: a transfer
from a less central to a more central agent will raise prices, the transfer in the reverse
direction will lower prices. It is useful to define M˜i =
∑
j Mji, as the weighted sum
of all paths of all lengths from all agents to agent i. The following result summarizes
these observations regarding the effects of a redistribution in endowments.
Proposition 6 Suppose M˜q > M˜q′. The price of a socially sensitive good is increas-
ing in transfers from agent q′ to q and decreasing in transfers from q to q′. There are
no price effects of a transfer from q′ to q, if M˜q = M˜q′.
Proof: Recall from equation (45) that prices are given by
p =
(1− σ)B′ωJ
Rν − (1− σ)B′νJ
(46)
where B′ωJ =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1Mijωj, and B
′
νJ =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1Mijνj. Let us consider a
transfer ∆ of the socially sensitive good from q′ to q. We will focus on the term B′νJ ,
as all other terms remain unchanged.
Define initial endowment distribution as (ω, ν), and the new endowment distribu-
tion as (ω, ν ′). Note that νi = ν ′i for all agents except q and q
′, where ν ′q = νq + ∆
while ν ′q′ = νq′ −∆. B′νJ can be written as
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∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1
Mijνj =
∑
i6=q,q′
∑
j 6=q,q′
Mijνj+
∑
j
Mqjνj+
∑
j
Mq′jνj+
∑
i6=q,q′
Miqνi+
∑
i6=q,q′
Miq′νi
(47)
In the same way, we can write the post transfer weighted centrality B′ν′J as:∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1
Mijν
′
j =
∑
i6=q,q′
∑
j 6=q,q′
Mijν
′
j+
∑
j
Mqjν
′
j+
∑
j
Mq′jν
′
j+
∑
i6=q,q′
Miqν
′
q+
∑
i6=q,q′
Miq′ν
′
q′
(48)
However, note that νi = ν
′
i, for all i 6= q, q′. So we can rewrite (48) as follows:∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1
Mijν
′
j =
∑
i6=q,q′
∑
j 6=q,q′
Mijνj +
∑
j 6=q,q′
Mqjνj +Mqqν
′
q +Mqq′ν
′
q′ +∑
j 6=q,q′
Mq′jνj +Mq′q′ν
′
q′ +Mqq′ν
′
q +
∑
i6=q,q′
Miqν
′
q +
∑
i6=q,q′
Miq′ν
′
q′
Comparing equations (47) and the previous equation, we can say that B′ν′J > B
′
νJ if
and only if
Mqqν
′
q +Mqq′ν
′
q′ +Mq′qν
′
q +Mq′q′ν
′
q′ +
∑
i6=q,q′
Miqν
′
q +
∑
i6=q,q′
Miq′ν
′
q
> Mqqνq +Mqq′νq′ +Mq′qνq +Mq′q′νq′ +
∑
i6=q,q′
Miqνq +
∑
i6=q,q′
Miq′νq′ (49)
This inequality holds if and only if M˜q =
∑
iMiq >
∑
iMiq′ = M˜q′ .

The above result allows us to make a number of observations. First observe that
the arguments in the proof tell us that the magnitude of change in sum of weighted
centralities is proportional to the relative centralities of the agents directly involved in
the transfer of endowments: indeed it is easy to see that B′ν′J−B′νJ = ∆[Mq−Mq′ ], so
that the larger the difference in centralities, the larger the effect on price. Moreover,
a transfer between two agents i and j with the same centrality has no effect on prices.
Since the endowments of all agents other than i and j are unaffected by this transfer,
and the prices remain unchanged, it follows that the equilibrium allocations of all
these agents are unaffected as well. Matters are significantly more complicated when
the centralities of agents are different as there are two effects to take into account:
the change in aggregate weighted centrality as well as the change in the weighted
centrality of specific individuals.
We now study numerical examples to quantify the magnitude of the price effects
and also to determine the utility implications of wealth and network differences across
agents.
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Example 4 Wealth and centrality are complementary.
Let α = 0.5 and σ = 0.1. We suppose that the network consists of two distinct
components, each with 4 agents forming a ring. We assume also that there is a link
between agents 1 and 5 as represented in network 2 of Figure 7. We suppose that 2
of the agents are rich, they each have 3 units of each goods. The remaining 6 agents
have each 1 unit of each good. We compare the situation in which the 2 rich are the
least central, agents 3 and 7, respectively, to the situation in which the rich are very
central, agents 1 and 5, respectively. We can interpret this as an instance of transfer
of resources from less central to more central agents. The results are reported in
Figure 8. Then Proposition 6 tells us that price of the socially sensitive good will
increase; the example shows that the price change and the consumption patterns is
substantial. The price increases by approximately 30%. Finally, we observe that
the resource transfer has large utility effects: wealth differences are reinforced by
centrality, so that rich agents have a higher utility when they are more central, while
poor agents, such as 2 and 6, are worse off when the rich agents are more central!
4
Example 5 Integrated and segregated societies.
Let α = 0.5 and σ = 0.5. Again we consider a network with two distinct compo-
nents, each with 4 agents. These networks are given in Figure 9. Suppose are 4 rich
players with endowments of 10 units of the standard good and 2 units of the socially
sensitive good. The 4 poor players have 5 units and 1 unit of the two goods, respec-
tively. We consider two types of societies, segregated (in which the poor and rich live
in different components) and integrated (in which the rich and poor live are mixed
in the same component). The results are reported in Figure 10. The main insight is
that the utility of the poor agents is significantly lower in integrated communities as
compared to segregated communities; the converse is true for rich agents!
4
The recent literature on happiness highlights the role of changing social comparisons
in understanding relatively low increases in happiness over time, see e.g., Layard
(2005). The previous example shows how changing neighbors does have interesting
and powerful effects on utility levels: in particular, substituting a poor neighbor by
a rich neighbor unambiguously lowers the utility of a person.
The findings on utility of rich and poor under segregation and integration suggest
that rich agents will desire links with the poor, who will in turn try and avoid the
rich! In a world where link formation requires consent on the part of both agents, this
suggests that a society segregated by economic class may well be stable. We briefly
explore this idea in section below.
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5 Choosing the right neighbours
Our results show that social structure has an impact on prices, allocations and welfare.
In this section we examine the incentives of agents to form and sustain social relations.
The idea we explore is a simple one: a social network is not incentive compatible if
an agent can improve his lot by severing a link or if a pair of agents can improve
their welfare by forming a tie. We emphasize that we are implicitly assuming that a
link reflects a social relation and is therefore bilateral in nature and requires mutual
agreement. Following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we say that a network g is
pairwise stable if no agent wishes to delete any link and if no pair of agents gains by
forming a link.
In our framework, welfare comparisons associated with the addition or deletion of a
link are delicate because they the set of neighbors changes, which in turn alters the
utility function. One way to move on this would be to follow Maccheroni, Marinacci
and Rustichini (2008), who consider inter-dependent preferences in which the com-
position of the neighborhood changes. We would then have to show that our utility
function is a representation of their preference order. We decided that this will take
us too far afield; so here we will simply assume that the choice is determined by the
value of the utility as described in equations (4) and (5). Keeping this qualification
in mind, we are able to state the following preliminary result.
Proposition 7 For small α, the empty network is pairwise stable.
Proof: In the empty network the equilibrium is characterized by no trade: so xi = ω
and yi = ν, while the utility is given by ω
σν1−σ. Denote by p(ge) the equilibrium price
under the empty network. Let us examine the incentives to form a link for an agent i:
if i were to form a link with some agent j, then we know from Proposition 2 that, for
small α, in network g = ge+gij the equilibrium price p(g) will be higher. At the same
time, the centrality of i will increase relative to the others, and so Proposition 1 tells
us his consumption (xi, yi) will satisfy xi < ω and yi > ν. Note that by symmetry,
xj = xi and yj = yi. So the utility of agent i in network g is x
σ
i y
1−σ
i . Observe next
that the new allocation lies on the new budget, which is strictly under the old budget
line, for all bundles north-west of the initial endowments (ω, ν). It then follows that
there exists a bundle (xˆ, yˆ) with xˆ > xi, and yˆ > yi, such that xˆ+ yˆp(g
e) < ω+νp(ge).
The bundle (xˆ, yˆ) lies in the interior of the budget set with price p(ge), but agent i
chooses (ω, ν), so it follows that ωσν1−σ > xˆσyˆ1−σ. Thus we have shown that:
xσi y
1−σ
i < xˆ
σyˆ1−σ < ωσν1−σ. (50)
In other words, agent i strictly loses by forming a link. Thus the empty network is
pairwise stable.
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We have been unable to characterize all stable networks. The complication we face
is that when two agents form a link their utility functions change and this makes a
comparison of pre and post link situations difficult for general networks. We have
examined a few numerical examples. These are presented in Figures 11 and 12. Figure
11 illustrates that the complete and empty network are stable, while Figure 12 makes
the point that players in a complete component have an incentive to delete a link if
there is an isolated player. This example provides a simple illustration of how general
equilibrium forces can shape the formation of social networks.
6 Discussion
In the paper so far, we have taken the view that individuals compare their consump-
tion of good 2 to the consumption of good 2 by others in their neighborhood, and that
they care about the total deviation in consumptions. In this section we will explore
a number of alternative possible specifications with a view to clarifying the scope of
our results.
6.1 All goods are positional
First we consider the simple case where consumption externalities are relevant in a
symmetric way for both goods. In that case, the utility is given by
uˆi(xi, x−i, yi, y−i) =
xi[1 + αni]− α
 ∑
j∈N(i)
xj
σyi[1 + αni]− α
 ∑
j∈N(i)
yj
1−σ
(51)
It is possible to show that there exists an equilibrium which is identical in prices and
allocations to an equilibrium in the economy with no consumption externalities. This
is analogous to a point made in a recent paper by Arrow and Dasgupta (2007). They
consider a dynamic model of work, leisure and savings, and find that if consump-
tion and leisure are equally susceptible to consumption externalities then there is no
distortion in equilibrium.
6.2 Comparisons with the average
We now turn to the examination of a Suppose that individuals care about their
consumption relative to the average consumption of their neighbours. In this case,
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u(xi, yi, {yj}j∈N(i)) = xσi
(
yi + α
[
yi − 1
ni
∑
j∈ni(g)
yj
])1−σ
(52)
In the homogeneous case, this average formulation suggests a natural outcome: every
consumer chooses the same bundle of goods. The demand function for good 2 becomes
f 2i (p, {yj}j∈N(i)) =
1− σ
p
ωi + pνi + σ
1− σ
α
1 + α
p
1
ni
∑
j∈N(i)
yj
 . (53)
Now we see that the analysis done in the previous sections can be extended in a
straightforward way to cover the case of average consumption effects. Indeed, the
matrix GN can now be defined as the N × N matrix of connections in which every
row is normalized so that the sum of the elements add to 1
1+α
. It is possible to show
that there is an equilibrium in which agents choose bundles which are identical to
their endowments and that this constitutes an equilibrium; in other words, network
centrality plays no role in shaping prices and allocations. However, the network does
play a role when agents are heterogeneous in their endowments as Figure 13 shows.
6.3 Direct negative externalities
Suppose that the consumption of others exerts a direct negative effect on neighbours.
In other words, suppose the consumption of good 2 by agent i constitutes a bad for
his neighbors, and directly lowers their net consumption of good 2. The utility of
individuals is then given by:
ui(xi, yi, y−i) = ui(xi, yi, {yj}j∈N(i)) = xσi
yi − α ∑
j∈N(i)
yj
1−σ (54)
In this case, the methods we have developed can be applied in a simpler form, and
the equilibrium price and allocations are proportional to the Katz-Bonacich centrality
as before and we can establish slightly stronger versions of the results on effects of
adding links on allocations and prices.
We can also model the negative externality as taking place at the average level.
In this case,
u(xi, yi, {yj}j∈N(i)) = xσi (yi −
α
ni
∑
j∈ni(g)
yj)
1−σ (55)
The average formulation suggests a natural outcome: every consumer chooses the
same bundle of goods. Clearly then the externality faced by every consumer is the
same and so the optimal consumption bundle under a common set of prices will be
the same as well. The market clearing equations are then nxi = nω and nyy = nν.
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The equilibrium allocation is then (ω, ν) . The equilibrium price can be obtained from
eq. (3)
ω = σ
ω + pν + α 1
ni
p
∑
j∈N(i)
ν
 = σ (ω + pν + αpν) (56)
giving
ω(1− σ) = p(σν + σαν) = pσ(1 + α) (57)
so that
p =
1− σ
σ(1 + α)
(58)
Note that it is independent of the network, as is to be expected since demands are
independent of the network connections. However, note that the equilibrium price
is related to the magnitude of the externality, and is indeed decreasing in the value
of α. We expect that network structure will matter, even if individuals care about
average consumptions if endowments are heterogeneous, as in the previous section.
7 Concluding remarks
Relative consumption concerns appear to be important in day to day life and economists
have been studying them for at least a hundred years, following the work of Veblen
(1989). This interest has spawned a large theoretical literature which examines the
implications of relative consumption concerns; for the most part, this work assumes
that individuals care about their own consumption as well as the average consumption
of society at large.
Introspection as well as recent empirical work suggest that we care about the relative
consumption of those close to us, i.e., our neighbors, friends, relatives, acquaintances
and colleagues. This motivates us to incorporate social networks into a market econ-
omy with a view to understanding how relative consumption concerns shape economic
exchange and well being.
We start with a characterization of equilibrium prices and allocations as a function
of (eigen vector) centralities in the social network. Indeed, in equilibrium, individual
consumption can be expressed as a function of her centrality in a social network, while
the price is proportional to the average network centrality of agents in the network.
We show that adding links to a social network leads to higher centralities and this in
turn pushes up the price of the socially sensitive good. We also derive a formula to
compute the critical link, i.e., the new link which maximizes price increase. Roughly
speaking, this formula says that, when social comparison effects are small, the critical
link is one which connects the two least linked agents. With regard to allocations,
we show that, as we add links to a network, the consumption of the socially sensitive
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good by the connected agents increases, while the reverse happens to non-connected
agents.
We then turn to a model with heterogenous endowments, and find that inequality in
network centrality and in wealth inequality reinforce each other. Thus a transfer of
resources from less to more central agents raises prices of the socially sensitive good
and alters allocations and utilities of all agents.
The large effects of networks on equilibrium prices, allocations and welfare naturally
raise the question: where do these networks come from and which networks are likely
to be stable? Our findings in Example 5 about the welfare effects of integration vs
segregation suggest that rich agents will desire links with their poor cohort, while the
opposite pressures will work on the poor. In a world where link formation requires
consent on the part of both agents, this suggests that stable communities should
consist of agents with similar endowments; in other words, a society segregated by
economic class. We have reported some preliminary findings in this paper; we leave
more systematic analysis of this problem to another paper.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: the verification of inequalities Consider an arbitrary
coordinate k
Bk = 1 + ασ{GNJ}k + α2σ2{(GN)2J}k + α3σ3{(GN)3J}k + ...
= 1 + ασ
∑N
h=1
gNkh + α
2σ2
∑N
q=1
∑N
p=1
gNkpg
N
pq +
α3σ3
∑N
q=1
∑N
p=1
∑N
h=1
gNkpg
N
phg
N
hq + ...
= 1 + ασ
∑
j∈N(k)
1
1 + αnk
+ α2σ2
∑N
p=1
gNkp
∑N
q=1
gNpq +
+α3σ3
∑N
p=1
gNkp
∑N
h=1
gNph
∑N
q=1
gNhq + ...
= 1 + ασ
nk
1 + αnk
+ α2σ2
∑N
p=1
gNkp
np
1 + αnp
+
+α3σ3
∑N
p=1
gNkp
∑N
h=1
gNph
nh
1 + αnh
+ ...
= 1 + ασ
nk
1 + αnk
+ α2σ2
1
1 + αnk
∑
p∈N(k)
np
1 + αnp
+
+α3σ3
1
1 + αnk
∑
p∈N(k)
1
1 + αnp
∑
h∈N(p)
nh
1 + αnh
+ ... (59)
The first term is the degree nk of the agent k scaled down by 1 + αnk. The
quantity αnk
1+αnk
is increasing in nk and bounded by 0 and 1. The second term is the
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sum over the neighbours N(k) of the degrees of the neighbours (also scaled down).
This decomposition also allows to define B recursively
Bk = 1 + ασ
1
1 + αnk
∑
j∈N(k)
Bj (60)
Now, from the series decomposition and since αnk
1+αnk
< 1, we have that
Bk < 1 +
[ ∞∑
s=1
σs
]
= 1 +
σ
1− σ (61)
We then get the bounds
1 < Bk <
1
1− σ (62)
The condition for the price to be positive is
1
1− σ
N∑N
i=1Bi
> 1 (63)
which clearly holds since 1
1−σ > Bi for all i. The condition xi > 0 is satisfied as both
(1− σ)Bi < 1 and (1− σ)B < 1 hold. The condition yi > 0 is automatically satisfied
as Bk > 1. Finally, we consider the condition yi(1 + αni) − α
∑
j∈N(i) yj > 0 which
may be rewritten as
yi − α 1
(1 + αni)
∑
j∈N(i)
yj > 0 (64)
or
Bi − α 1
(1 + αni)
∑
j∈N(i)
Bj > 0 (65)
Using the recursive formulation for B, we see that the condition indeed holds
1 + ασ
1
1 + αni
∑
j∈N(i)
Bj − α 1
(1 + αni)
∑
j∈N(i)
Bj (66)
= 1− (1− σ) α
1 + αni
∑
j∈N(i)
Bj (67)
> 1− (1− σ) αni
1 + αni
1
1− σ (68)
> 1− 1 (69)
> 0 (70)

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Proof of Proposition 2: If a link is added between i and j, the matrix G is modified
to G˜ = G+∆ij +∆ji where ∆ij is the matrix defined by ∆ij = {tpq}Np,q=1 with tij = 1
and tpq = 0 otherwise. In order to evaluate how the vector B is modified by the
addition of the link it is useful to note that
GN =
(
GTΛ
)T
(71)
where (.)T means transpose and Λ is defined as
Λ =

1
1+αn1
0 0 0
0 1
1+αn2
0 0
0 0 ... 0
0 0 0 1
1+αnn
 (72)
Then the addition of a link between i and j implies that GN becomes G˜N and
G˜N =
(
G˜T Λ˜
)T
=
(
(G+∆ij +∆ji)
T Λ˜
)T
with Λ˜ defined as Λ but with the elements at position i and j modified to become
1
1+α(ni+1)
and 1
1+α(nj+1)
.
Therefore, introducing a link between i and j modifies B as follows
B˜ =
[ ∞∑
s=0
αsσs(G˜N)s
]
J (73)
=
[ ∞∑
s=0
αsσs
[(
(G+∆ij +∆ji)
T Λ˜
)T]s]
J (74)
Clearly, introducing a connection between i and j affects the value of all the
elements of the vector B. However, this effect is vanishing with the distance and as
ασ −→ 0. It is then useful to look at the first terms in the expression for B noting
that all terms are positive. We consider an arbitrary coordinate k. We get for the
first three terms
Bk = 1 + ασ
nk
1 + αnk
+ α2σ2
∑N
p=1
gNkp
np
1 + αnp
+
+α3σ3
∑N
p=1
gNkp
∑N
h=1
gNph
nh
1 + αnh
+ ...
= 1 + ασ
nk
1 + αnk
+ α2σ2
1
1 + αnk
∑
p∈N(k)
np
1 + αnp
+
+α3σ3
1
1 + αnk
∑
p∈N(k)
1
1 + αnp
∑
h∈N(p)
nh
1 + αnh
+ ... (75)
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The expansion for Bk allows us to evaluate the effect of the introduction of a link
between i and j. Denote this change as ∆Bk. Using the series expansion we then
define ∆Bk =
∑∞
s=1∆B
s
k where the suffix indicates the power of ασ. For the first
term in the series we have
∆B1i = ασ
[
ni + 1
1 + α{ni + 1} −
ni
1 + αni
]
=
ασ
[1 + α{ni + 1}] [1 + αni] (76)
The second order term ∆B2i is
∆B2i = α
2σ2
1
1 + α(ni + 1)
[∑
p∈N(i)
np
1 + αnp
+
nj + 1
1 + αnj + 1
]
−α2σ2 1
1 + αni
∑
p∈N(i)
np
1 + αnp
= α2σ2
[
1
1 + α(ni + 1)
− 1
1 + αni
]∑
p∈N(i)
np
1 + αnp
+α2σ2
1
1 + α(ni + 1)
nj + 1
1 + αnj + 1
= α2σ2
−α
(1 + α(ni + 1)) (1 + αni)
∑
p∈N(i)
np
1 + αnp
+α2σ2
1
1 + α(ni + 1)
nj + 1
1 + αnj + 1
= ασ2
1
1 + α(ni + 1)
[
αnj + 1
1 + αnj + 1
− α
1 + αni
∑
p∈N(i)
αnp
1 + αnp
]
(77)
Consider now how the centralities of the neighbours of i and j are affected. Denote
by h a generical neighbour of i, i.e. h ∈ N(i), h 6= i, j. Then, the addition of a link
between agent i and j has no effect on nh so that ∆B
1
h = 0. The second term in the
expression of Bh is α
2σ2 1
1+αnh
∑
p∈N(h)
np
1+αnp
so that
∆B2h = α
2σ2
1
1 + αnh
[
ni + 1
1 + α(ni + 1)
+
∑
p∈N(h)
p6=i
np
1 + αnp
]
−α2σ2 1
1 + αnh
[
ni
1 + αni
+
∑
p∈N(h)
p6=i
np
1 + αnp
]
= α2σ2
1
1 + αnh
[
ni + 1
1 + α(ni + 1)
− ni
1 + αni
]
= α2σ2
1
1 + αnh
1
(1 + α(ni + 1)) (1 + αni)
(78)
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For further neighbours, only higher order terms in ασ are non-zero.
We are in a position to evaluate how
∑N
k=1Bk is affected by the new link. Let∑N
k=1 B˜k be the value of the sum after the new link is introduced. If we keep only
the first two terms of the expansion we have:
∆
N∑
k=1
Bk =
N∑
k=1
B˜k −
N∑
k=1
Bk
' ∆B1i +∆B2i +∆B1j +∆B2j +
∑
k∈N(i)
∆B2k +
∑
k∈N(j)
∆B2k (79)
Now,
∆B1i +∆B
1
j ' ασ
[
ni + 1
1 + α(ni + 1)
+
nj + 1
1 + α(nj + 1)
− ni
1 + αni
− nj
1 + αnj
]
' ασ
(1 + α(ni + 1)) (1 + αni)
+
ασ
(1 + α(nj + 1)) (1 + αnj)
(80)
On the other hand,
∆B2i +∆B
2
j ' α2σ2
−α
(1 + α(ni + 1)) (1 + αni)
∑
h∈N(i)
nh
1 + αnh
+ασ2
1
1 + α(ni + 1)
αnj
1 + αnj
+α2σ2
−α
(1 + α(nj + 1)) (1 + αnj)
∑
h∈N(j)
nh
1 + αnh
+ασ2
1
1 + α(nj + 1)
αni
1 + αni
(81)
Finally, ∑
h∈N(i)∪N(j)
∆B2h =
α2σ2
(1 + α(ni + 1)) (1 + αni)
∑
h∈N(i)
1
1 + αnh
+
α2σ2
(1 + α(nj + 1)) (1 + αnj)
∑
h∈N(j)
1
1 + αnh
(82)
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Therefore,
∆
N∑
k=1
Bk =
ασ
(1 + α(ni + 1)) (1 + αni)
+
ασ
(1 + α(nj + 1)) (1 + αnj)
+ασ2
1
1 + α(nj + 1)
αni
1 + αni
+ασ2
1
1 + α(ni + 1)
αnj
1 + αnj
+α2σ2
1
(1 + α(ni + 1)) (1 + αni)
(1− α)
∑
h∈N(i)
nh
1 + αnh
+α2σ2
1
(1 + α(nj + 1)) (1 + αnj)
(1− α)
∑
h∈N(j)
nh
1 + αnh
(83)
Finally, recall that the equilibrium price is given by
p =
ω
ν
[
1
1− σ
1
B
− 1
]−1
(84)
with B = 1
N
∑N
k=1Bk. Therefore, as the first two terms increase strictly, and we can
ignore the higher order terms, by suitably lowering α, the sum B increases when a
new link is added. This implies that the equilibrium price also increases.

Proof of Proposition 3: Fix a network g 6= gc; the critical link gij, solves the
following problem:
max
gij
B¯(g + gij)− B¯(g). (85)
We note from proof of Proposition 2, that for small enough α this is equivalent to a
link which maximizes the first order effects of a change in network, i.e., maximizes
∆B1i + ∆B
1
j . From equation 80 the first order effects of a link between i and j are
given by:
∆B1i +∆B
1
j ' ασ
[
ni + 1
1 + α(ni + 1)
+
nj + 1
1 + α(nj + 1)
− ni
1 + αni
− nj
1 + αnj
]
' ασ
(1 + α(ni + 1)) (1 + αni)
+
ασ
(1 + α(nj + 1)) (1 + αnj)
(86)
So the critical link maximizes the expression in 86; the proof now follows.

Proof of Proposition 4: First, consider the change in the consumption of the
socially sensitive good by an agent h with h 6= i, j when a link is added between i and
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j.Let y˜h denote the corrected value of yh. A similar convention is used for the other
variables. We have
y˜h =
B˜h∑N
k=1 B˜k
Nν (87)
It will turn out that first order terms are sufficient to characterise the bahavior as
α 7→ 0. From last section we know that this of order:
∆Σ ≡
N∑
k=1
B˜k−
N∑
k=1
Bk =
ασ
(1 + α(ni + 1)) (1 + αni)
+
ασ
(1 + α(nj + 1)) (1 + αnj)
(88)
Furthermore, ∆B1h = 0. Then
y˜h − yh = Bh
∆Σ+
∑N
k=1Bk
Nν − Bh∑N
k=1Bk
Nν
= Nν
(Bh)
(∑N
k=1Bk
)
− (Bh)
(
∆Σ+
∑N
k=1Bk
)
(
∆Σ+
∑N
k=1Bk
)(∑N
k=1Bk
)

= Nν
 −Bh∆Σ(
∆Σ+
∑N
k=1Bk
)(∑N
k=1Bk
)

' −Nν∆Σ Bh(∑N
k=1Bk
)2 (89)
As α 7→ 0 we get
y˜h − yh ' −2Nνασ Bh(∑N
k=1Bk
)2 ≤ 0 (90)
Remark: We only need αni << 1 so that (1 + α(ni + 1)) (1 + αni) ' 1 for all i.
We now analyze the effect on the agents who have formed a link. Again consider
only the first order terms. We have
y˜i '
Bi +
ασ
(1+α(ni+1))(1+αni)
∆Σ+
∑N
k=1Bk
Nν (91)
and
y˜j '
Bj +
ασ
(1+α(nj+1))(1+αnj)
∆Σ+
∑N
k=1Bk
Nν (92)
Therefore,
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y˜i − yi '
Bi +
ασ
(1+α(ni+1))(1+αni)
∆Σ+
∑N
k=1Bk
Nν − Bi∑N
k=1Bk
Nν (93)
Similarly,
y˜j − yj '
Bi +
ασ
(1+α(nj+1))(1+αnj)
∆Σ+
∑N
k=1Bk
Nν − Bj∑N
k=1Bk
Nν (94)
So that the aggregate change in consumption of socially sensitive good by i and j is:
yi − yi + yj − yj] = Bi +Bj +∆Σ
∆Σ+
∑n
k=1Bi
− Bi +Bj∑n
k=1Bk
> 0. (95)
We now examine the effects on demand of good 1, when a single connection is added
to the network between i and j. Assume that (1 + α(ni + 1)) (1 + αni) ' 1 or equiv-
alently that αni << 1, for all i then. For agent i, we have
1
ω
x˜i =
N − (1− σ)NB˜i
N − (1− σ)∑Nk=1 B˜k
' N − (1− σ)N(ασ +Bi)
N − (1− σ)[2ασ +∑Nk=1Bk] (96)
Therefore
1
ωN
∆xi =
1
ωN
(x˜i − xi) (97)
=
1− (1− σ)(ασ +Bi)
N − (1− σ)[2ασ +∑Nk=1Bk]
− 1− (1− σ)Bi
N − (1− σ)∑Nk=1Bk (98)
After reducing to a common denominator, the numerator becomes
Num = [1− (1− σ)(ασ +Bi)][N − (1− σ)
∑N
k=1
Bk]
−[1− (1− σ)Bi][N − (1− σ)[2ασ +
∑N
k=1
Bk]] (99)
Let
A1 = 1− (1− σ)Bi and A2 = N − (1− σ)
∑N
k=1
Bk (100)
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Then
Num = [A1 − (1− σ)ασ)][A2]− [A1][A2 − (1− σ)2ασ]
= [−(1− σ)(ασ)]A2 + A1(1− σ)2ασ
= [(1− σ)ασ][2A1 − A2] (101)
Then
Num = [(1− σ)ασ]
[2− 2(1− σ)Bi −N + (1− σ)
∑N
k=1
Bk]
= [(1− σ)ασ]
(
2−N + (1− σ)
[∑N
k=1
Bk − 2Bi
])
(102)
Finally we get
∆xi = ωN [(1−σ)ασ] 2−N + (1− σ)[
∑N
k=1Bk − 2Bi](
N − (1− σ)[2ασ +∑Nk=1Bk)(N − (1− σ)∑Nk=1Bk) (103)
Note that the condition for a positive price is (1− σ)∑Nk=1Bk < N and that Bi > 1
by construction. Therefore, ∆xi < 0.
For a node h with h 6= i, j, the increase in consumption of first good is computed as
follows.
1
ω
∆xh =
1
ω
(x˜h − xh)
=
N − (1− σ)NBh
N − (1− σ)[2ασ +∑Nk=1Bk]
− N − (1− σ)NBh
N − (1− σ)[∑Nk=1Bk] (104)
First observe that ∆xh/ω > 0, as N − (1 − σ)[
∑N
k=1Bk] > 0. After reducing to the
same denominator, the numerator becomes:
Num = [N − (1− σ)NBh][(
N − (1− σ)[
N∑
k=1
Bk]
)
−
(
N − (1− σ)[2ασ +
N∑
k=1
Bk]
)]
= [N − (1− σ)NBh] [(1− σ)2ασ]
= N(1− σ)2ασ − (1− σ)22ασNBh
= N(1− σ)2ασ [1− (1− σ)Bh] (105)
32
Therefore the increase in xh decreases with the (relative) centrality of h; in other
words, for fixed
∑
Bi, an increase in Bh reduces the increase in demand for good 1.

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Empty Ring 
Star Core-periphery       
Figure 1: Classical social networks
36
Empty Star Ring Core-periphery
x1 10 7.1233 10 8.75
x2 10 10.411 10 8.75
x3 10 10.411 10 8.75
x4 10 10.411 10 8.75
x5 10 10.411 10 11.25
x6 10 10.411 10 11.25
x7 10 10.411 10 11.25
x8 10 10.411 10 11.25
y1 10 11.6279 10 10.6452
y2 10 9.7674 10 10.6452
y3 10 9.7674 10 10.6452
y4 10 9.7674 10 10.6452
y5 10 9.7674 10 9.3548
y6 10 9.7674 10 9.3548
y7 10 9.7674 10 9.3548
y8 10 9.7674 10 9.3548
u1 10 11.3672 10 9.9393
u2 10 9.5919 10 9.9393
u3 10 9.5919 10 9.9393
u4 10 9.5919 10 9.9393
u5 10 9.5919 10 9.8987
u6 10 9.5919 10 9.8987
u7 10 9.5919 10 9.8987
u8 10 9.5919 10 9.8987
Price 1 1.7671 2 1.9375
endow.=10
alpha=0.5
sigma=0.5
Figure 2: Social networks shape general equilibrium
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Figure 3: Networks with Isolated Agent
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Ring 2 to 7 Ring+Link 2-5 Ring+2-5,3-6,4-7 Complete hexa
x1 10.7933 11.0183 11.3892 12.4379
x2 8.5529 8.0418 8.2078 8.6765
x3 9.2643 9.4517 8.673 8.2997
x4 9.3545 9.5039 9.6842 8.3345
x5 9.3645 8.5117 8.673 9.1296
x6 9.3545 9.5039 8.7104 8.3345
x7 9.2643 9.4517 9.6307 8.2997
x8 14.0518 14.517 15.0318 16.4877
y1 9.5618 9.465 9.3076 8.9389
y2 10.7994 11.0288 10.8933 10.5761
y3 10.4064 10.2881 10.6614 10.7401
y4 10.3566 10.2606 10.1574 10.7249
y5 10.351 10.7819 10.6614 10.3788
y6 10.3566 10.2606 10.6428 10.7249
y7 10.4064 10.2881 10.1841 10.7401
y8 7.7619 7.6269 7.4921 7.1762
u1 9.8247 9.7813 9.9198 10.0499
u2 10.0508 10.096 9.9846 9.9145
u3 9.7375 9.6886 9.6152 9.484
u4 9.8323 9.7421 9.6569 9.5238
u5 9.8428 9.7549 9.6152 9.5234
u6 9.8323 9.7421 9.6569 9.5238
u7 9.7375 9.6886 9.6152 9.484
u8 10.4436 10.5223 10.7081 10.8775
Price 1.8104 1.9034 2.1133 2.2975
endow.=10.
alpha=0.5
sigma=0.5
Figure 4: No man is an island
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Figure 5: Critical links
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Two Stars Linked centers Linked laterals
x1 8.5714 8 8.7943
x2 10.4762 10.6667 9.3617
x3 10.4762 10.6667 10.922
x4 10.4762 10.6667 10.922
x5 8.5714 8 8.7943
x6 10.4762 10.6667 9.3617
x7 10.4762 10.6667 10.922
x8 10.4762 10.6667 10.922
y1 10.8333 11.1111 10.6564
y2 9.7222 9.6296 10.3475
y3 9.7222 9.6296 9.4981
y4 9.7222 9.6296 9.4981
y5 10.8333 11.1111 10.6564
y6 9.7222 9.6296 10.3475
y7 9.7222 9.6296 9.4981
y8 9.7222 9.6296 9.4981
u1 10.351 10.328 10.2596
u2 9.7996 9.7373 9.7685
u3 9.7996 9.7373 9.8698
u4 9.7996 9.7373 9.8698
u5 10.351 10.328 10.2596
u6 9.7996 9.7373 9.7685
u7 9.7996 9.7373 9.8698
u8 9.7996 9.7373 9.8698
Price 1.7143 1.8 1.8369
endow.=10
alpha=0.5
sigma=0.5
Figure 6: Linking hubs and spokes
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Figure 7: Rich and poor central agents
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Rich+Isolated Rich+Isolated Rich+Connected Rich+Connected
Endowments Allocations Endowments Allocations
x1 1 0.806 3 4.5852
x2 1 0.1429 1 0.1429
x3 3 4.9083 1 1.1291
x4 1 0.1429 1 0.1429
x5 1 0.806 3 4.5852
x6 1 0.1429 1 0.1429
x7 3 4.9083 1 1.1291
x8 1 0.1429 1 0.1429
y1 1 1.0104 3 2.9261
y2 1 1.0461 1 1.04
y3 3 2.8974 1 0.994
y4 1 1.0461 1 1.04
y5 1 1.0104 3 2.9261
y6 1 1.0461 1 1.04
y7 3 2.8974 1 0.994
y8 1 1.0461 1 1.04
u1 0.9564 4.7889
u2 0.1387 0.1221
u3 4.7645 0.9647
u4 0.1387 0.1221
u5 0.9564 4.7889
u6 0.1387 0.1221
u7 4.7645 0.9647
u8 0.1387 0.1221
Price 18.6045 21.4389
Alpha=0.5
Sigma=0.1
Figure 8: Wealth and centrality are complementary
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The rich 
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Figure 9: Segregated and integrated societies
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Endowments Segregated Integrated
x1 5 5 3
x2 5 5 3
x3 5 5 3
x4 5 5 3
x5 10 10 12
x6 10 10 12
x7 10 10 12
x8 10 10 12
y1 1 1 1.2
y2 1 1 1.2
y3 1 1 1.2
y4 1 1 1.2
y5 2 2 1.8
y6 2 2 1.8
y7 2 2 1.8
y8 2 2 1.8
u1 2.2361 2.2361 1.3416
u2 2.2361 2.2361 1.3416
u3 2.2361 2.2361 1.3416
u4 2.2361 2.2361 1.3416
u5 4.4721 4.4721 5.3666
u6 4.4721 4.4721 5.3666
u7 4.4721 4.4721 5.3666
u8 4.4721 4.4721 5.3666
Price 10 10
alpha=0.5
sigma=0.5
Figure 10: Keeping up with the neighbors
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Complete Delete 1-2 Empty Add 1-2
x1 10 10.411 10 8.4211
x2 10 10.411 10 8.4211
x3 10 9.863 10 10.5263
x4 10 9.863 10 10.5263
x5 10 9.863 10 10.5263
x6 10 9.863 10 10.5263
x7 10 9.863 10 10.5263
x8 10 9.863 10 10.5263
y1 10 9.906 10 11.4286
y2 10 9.906 10 11.4286
y3 10 10.0313 10 9.5238
y4 10 10.0313 10 9.5238
y5 10 10.0313 10 9.5238
y6 10 10.0313 10 9.5238
y7 10 10.0313 10 9.5238
y8 10 10.0313 10 9.5238
u1 10 9.9606 10 9.8102
u2 10 9.9606 10 9.8102
u3 10 10.0088 10 10.0125
u4 10 10.0088 10 10.0125
u5 10 10.0088 10 10.0125
u6 10 10.0088 10 10.0125
u7 10 10.0088 10 10.0125
u8 10 10.0088 10 10.0125
Price 4.5 4.3699 1 1.1053
Endow.=10.
alpha=0.5
sigma=0.5
Figure 11: Complete and empty networks are stable
46
7 complete+8 Delete 1-2
x1 9.3677 9.4808
x2 9.3677 9.4808
x3 9.3677 9.3624
x4 9.3677 9.3624
x5 9.3677 9.3624
x6 9.3677 9.3624
x7 9.3677 9.3624
x8 14.4262 14.2264
y1 11.0488 10.8941
y2 11.0488 10.8941
y3 11.0488 11.0979
y4 11.0488 11.0979
y5 11.0488 11.0979
y6 11.0488 11.0979
y7 11.0488 11.0979
y8 2.6586 2.722
u1 9.5236 9.5293
u2 9.5236 9.5293
u3 9.5236 9.554
u4 9.5236 9.554
u5 9.5236 9.554
u6 9.5236 9.554
u7 9.5236 9.554
u8 12.1816 12.058
Price 0.6029 0.5807
Endow.=10.
alpha=0.9
sigma=0.9
Figure 12: General equilibrium effects on link stability
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Endowm Empty Disconected Link 1-5
x1 1 2.26 2.3034 2.0967
x2 1 2.26 2.3034 2.3
x3 1 2.26 2.3034 2.3033
x4 1 2.26 2.3034 2.3
x5 5 3.74 3.6966 3.9033
x6 5 3.74 3.6966 3.7
x7 5 3.74 3.6966 3.6967
x8 5 3.74 3.6966 3.7
y1 1 0.9417 0.9598 0.9662
y2 1 0.9417 0.9598 0.9599
y3 1 0.9417 0.9598 0.9598
y4 1 0.9417 0.9598 0.9599
y5 1.5 1.5583 1.5402 1.5338
y6 1.5 1.5583 1.5402 1.5401
y7 1.5 1.5583 1.5402 1.5402
y8 1.5 1.5583 1.5402 1.5401
u1 1.4805 1.0476 0.9536
u2 1.4805 1.0476 1.046
u3 1.4805 1.0476 1.0475
u4 1.4805 1.0476 1.046
u5 2.45 1.6812 1.7752
u6 2.45 1.6812 1.6827
u7 2.45 1.6812 1.6812
u8 2.45 1.6812 1.6827
Price 21.6 32.4 32.4
alpha=0.5
sigma=0.1
Figure 13: Effects of neighbor averages in an unequal society
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